

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 022698

42

ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /020 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:THIRSCHFELD

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:THIRSCHFELD

----- 086845

R 251250Z JAN 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USCINCEUR

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 222698

"FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT

QUOTE

O 102100Z NOV 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

INFO USCINCEUR

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USNMR SHAPE

SECRET STATE 222698

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, AU, GW, UK

SUBJ: US PRESENTATION ON STABILIZING MEASURES

VIENNA FOR US MBFR DEL

YOU SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO PRESENT

U.S. VIEWS ON STABILIZING MEASURES AS DESCRIBED BELOW.

U.S. RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES PUT FORWARD BY UK  
AND FRG SEPTTEL.

1. IN PARAGRAPHS 23 AND 29 OF THE "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO  
NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR," THE ALLIANCE AGREED TO GIVE FURTHER  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 022698

URGENT CONSIDERATION TO STABILIZING MEASURES. THE UNITED  
STATES WELCOMED THIS AGREEMENT FOR TWO BASIC REASONS.

FIRST, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES  
CONCERNING STABILIZING MEASURES WHICH CLEARLY WARRANT

FURTHER EXAMINATION. SECOND, EARLY AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON CERTAIN OF THESE ISSUES IS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO PROCEED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN VIENNA ALONG AGREED LINES.

2. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON AN URGENT BASIS IN THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AND WE HAVE BEFORE US THE WELL-CONSIDERED AND VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. IN OUR VIEW, THE TABLING OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 8 MAKES IT MORE IMPORTANT EVEN THAN BEFORE FOR US TO ACHIEVE A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF AGREEMENT ON THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES PROMPTLY, IN ORDER THAT THIS AGREEMENT CAN BE REFLECTED, AS APPROPRIATE, IN THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WE OURSELVES WILL PUT FORWARD. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR DISCUSSION HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THESE ISSUES RAISE REAL AND VALID SECURITY CONCERNS FOR MANY ALLIES. THEY THEREFORE MERIT THE MOST EARNEST AND DELIBERATE ATTENTION OF OUR GOVERNMENTS.

3. AS A UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EXAMINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, I SHOULD LIKE TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION THE FOLLOWING THREE ISSUES WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE CENTRAL TO THE PROBLEM:

A. WHICH MEASURES SHOULD BE AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND PROPOSED TO THE PACT?

B. SHOULD THESE MEASURES BE APPLICABLE TO US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY OR TO THOSE OF ALL RELEVANT NATO AND WARSAW PACT NATIONS?

C. HOW SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MEASURES BE VIEWED, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, IN RELATION TO NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND WHAT TACTICAL SCENARIO SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR BROACHING THE SUBJECT OF  
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 022698

STABILIZING MEASURES TO THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES?

4. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT WE MUST HAVE SOLUTIONS TO THESE QUESTIONS AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY.

5. OUTLINED BELOW ARE OUR VIEWS ON THE ISSUES, AND OUR PROPOSAL FOR HANDLING STABILIZING MEASURES IN INITIAL SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. ATTACHED AS AN ANNEX IS A MORE DETAILED EXPOSITION OF A POSSIBLE SET OF STABILIZING MEASURES FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST.

A. WHICH MEASURES

(1) THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE FIRST FOUR MEASURES IN THE ATTACHED ANNEX OF DETAILED PROPOSALS, (DRAWN FROM PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE ALLIANCE PAPER) WHETHER THEY PRECEDE REDUCTIONS OR NOT, WOULD ENHANCE THE VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US. THEY ARE:

- I. PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS; (THIS MEASURE SHOULD NOT SERVE TO INHIBIT POSSIBLE ALLIED MOVEMENTS TO OR FROM BERLIN)
- II. PRE-ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL (OR US AND SOVIET) FORCES IN THE AREA
- III. LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, LOCATION, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL (OR US AND SOVIET) FORCES IN THE AREA;
- IV. EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL (OR US AND SOVIET) FORCES IN THE AREA.

(2) IN DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE "ALLIANCE APPROACH" A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS WERE RAISED TO MEASURE II OF PARAGRAPH 29, "LIMITATIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES  
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 022698

ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA." IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT MEASURE III OF PARAGRAPH 29, "NOTIFICATION, WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA," ALTHOUGH LISTED SEPARATELY, COULD BE CONSIDERED A LESS STRINGENT SUBSTITUTE FOR MEASURE II. WE HAVE NOW DEVELOPED THESE TWO MEASURES IN DETAIL, ARE EXAMINING WHICH, IF EITHER, WE COULD SUPPORT, AND WILL REPORT FURTHER ON THEM. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER COMMENTS FROM OUR

ALLIES AND SACEUR ON THESE TWO MEASURES AS CONCEPTS AND ON THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE IN MEASURES II AND II FROM PARAGRAPH 23, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED IN THE ANNEX.

(3) WITH REGARD TO OTHER MEASURES LISTED IN THE ALLIANCE APPROACH, WE BELIEVE TWO MEASURES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 29 SHOULD BE RE-EVALUATED WITH A VIEW TOWARD POSSIBLE INCORPORATION AS PART OF THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF ANY REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT OR CONSIDERED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION. THESE ARE:

- (A) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA; AND

(B) AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE LEVEL OF US AND  
SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED BY A  
REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

(4) THE ANNEX DESCRIBES THE MEASURES IN TERMS THAT  
THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES WOULD PROTECT THE INTERESTS  
AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME  
APPLYING A USEFUL MEASURE OF CONTROL ON THE SOVIET  
FORCES. WE DO BELIEVE THAT STABILIZING MEASURES NEED TO  
BE PART OF THE MBFR PROCESS, AND THAT WITHDRAWAL OR  
REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON  
STABILIZING MEASURES. FURTHER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE  
IMPACT OF ANY SINGLE MEASURE IN INHIBITING THE SOVIETS  
WOULD BE LIMITED, BUT THE COMBINED EFFECT OF A SERIES OF  
MEASURES COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. THEREFORE WE BELIEVE IT  
IMPORTANT TO PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF MEASURES.

B. WHAT APPLICATION  
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 022698

(1) THE INCREASED CONFIDENCE WE SEEK FROM  
STABILIZING MEASURES IS PRIMARILY CONFIDENCE WITH REGARD  
TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIONS, RATHER THAN THOSE OF  
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. WE MUST EXPECT THAT  
STABILIZING MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED SYMMETRICALLY ON  
BOTH SIDES. WE MUST THEREFORE DECIDE WHETHER THE MEASURES  
WE WILL PROPOSE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR APPLICATION TO SOVIET  
AND US FORCES ONLY, TO SOVIET AND US FORCES WITH AN  
ADDITIONAL PROVISION FOR THE ACCESSION OF OTHER STATES,  
OR TO ALL FORCES. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE A  
FIXED PREFERENCE ON THIS ISSUE. WE SEE MERIT IN  
CONCENTRATING ON SOVIET FORCES AND BELIEVE THE US COULD  
ACCEPT THE SAME LIMITATIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF ITS  
FORCES.

(2) AS CONCERNS SUBSTANCE, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE  
DESIRABLE TO LIMIT THE APPLICATION OF MOST, IF NOT ALL,  
STABILIZING MEASURES TO US AND SOVIET FORCES. AT THE  
SAME TIME, WE ALSO SEE VALUE IN ALLIED PARTICIPATION  
IN STABILIZING MEASURES AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE  
MULTILATERAL CHARACTER OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREE-  
MENTS. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE STRONG POTENTIAL  
SOVIET INTEREST IN INCLUDING NON-US NATO FORCES IN  
FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENTS IN SOME WAY. GIVEN THESE  
CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, ON BALANCE,  
STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD AS APPLICABLE  
TO US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, BUT THAT WE AGREE NOW  
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT THE WEST COULD IN PURSUIT OF ITS  
FIRST-PHASE OBJECTIVES ENVISAGE THE APPLICATION OF SOME  
MEASURES TO ALL FORCES, IF AGREEMENTS COULD BE SO WORDED  
AS NOT TO AFFECT ADVERSELY FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE  
COOPERATION.

(3) SO FAR AS THE AREA OF APPLICATION IS CONCERNED, WE AGREE WITH THE "ALLIANCE APPROACH" WHICH PROVIDES THAT "THESE MEASURES WOULD BE PUT FORWARD, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AS APPLYING ONLY TO MOVEMENTS INTO AND ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING SUCH MEASURES TO FORCES IN SPECIFIED AREAS OUTSIDE THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA IS

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 022698

NOT EXCLUDED." UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS FOR MBFR ARE WELL-KNOWN, AS ARE THE CONCERNS OF OTHER ALLIES WITH REGARD TO AREA OF APPLICATION. HOWEVER, SINCE WE ARE CONSIDERING "THE FIRST INSTANCE," WE WOULD ASSUME THAT THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DISCUSSION.

#### C. TREATMENT IN INITIAL SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

(1) WE WILL WISH TO PUT THE EAST ON NOTICE EARLY OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS AND TO TEST EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE SERIOUSLY; BUT WITHOUT PERMITTING EASTERN USE OF THIS DISCUSSION AS A STALLING DEVICE. IT IS THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT, ON BALANCE, OUR ESSENTIAL PURPOSE IN PROPOSING SUCH MEASURES FOR DISCUSSION WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT RISK IF WE MAKE THE SUBSTANCE

OF STABILIZING MEASURES THE FIRST TOPIC OF DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BUT DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT IT IS PRACTICAL TO SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT ON AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH MEASURES ONLY WHEN SUCH A DECISION CAN BE TAKEN IN LIGHT OF EASTERN REACTIONS AND OF THE CONCRETE NEGOTIATING SITUATION.

(2) IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE THE MEASURES AS STABILIZING MEASURES WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS. THE PROPOSED LIST LENDS ITSELF TO NEGOTIATION AS CONSTRAINTS TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS; HENCE, WE PROPOSE THAT IT BE TITLED SIMPLY: "STABILIZING MEASURES".

6. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ALLIES PURSUE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO DEALING WITH STABILIZING MEASURES:

(A) IN PRESENTING THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WE  
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 022698

WOULD INCLUDE AS THE FIRST MAJOR SECTION "STABILIZING MEASURES," WHICH COULD INCLUDE BY TITLE THE LIST OF STABILIZING MEASURES AGREED TO BY THE ALLIANCE.

(B) AFTER AN EXCHANGE WITH THE EAST ON THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL, WHICH WE WOULD ENVISAGE AS LASTING UNTIL CHRISTMAS, THE ALLIES WOULD MOVE TO A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SEQUENCE ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 51 OF THE "ALLIANCE APPROACH."

(C) THE WEST WOULD PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST A LIST OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WHICH WOULD NOT BE CATEGORIZED AS EITHER "PRE-REDUCTION" OR "ACCOMPANYING".

(D) AFTER A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROBE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THIS TOPIC, THE ALLIES WOULD THEN MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE OR POSSIBLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN STABILIZING MEASURES, AND WHETHER THAT POSSIBILITY WARRANTED NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

#### ANNEX: STABILIZING MEASURES

##### I. PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA.

1. THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PROVIDE TO EACH OF THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OR OTHER AGREED MEANS, NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER 1 (SEE FOOTNOTE 1) OF EACH YEAR, A SCHEDULE OF CERTAIN ANTICIPATED MOVEMENTS OF ITS ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL/UNITS (SEE FOOTNOTE 2) INTO AND OUT OF THE GUIDELINES AREA FOR THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR YEAR.

2. SUCH A SCHEDULE WOULD STATE THE NUMBER OF US OR SOVIET ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL SCHEDULED TO ENTER OR LEAVE THE GUIDELINES AREA DURING EACH MONTH OF THE CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH NUMBERS MAY EXCLUDE INDIVIDUAL  
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 022698

PERSONNEL ENTERING (OR LEAVING) WHO ARE TO REMAIN IN (OR OUTSIDE) THE AREA FOR LESS THAN 30 DAYS.

3. THE SCHEDULE WOULD SEPARATELY LIST EACH ANTICIPATED ENTRY INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA OF 5000 OR MORE INDIVIDUAL ACTIVE DUTY GROUND PERSONNEL WITHIN ANY 24-HOUR PERIOD, OR ANY UNITS WITH NORMAL LEVELS OF MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONNEL REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY POINTS OF ENTRY INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA MAY BE INVOLVED, AND REGARDLESS OF WHAT MODES OF TRANSPORTATION MAY BE USED.

4. THE SCHEDULE WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT EACH SEPARATELY LISTED MOVEMENT (AS DEFINED IN PARA I, 3 ABOVE):

- (A) THE NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED;
- (B) THE DESIGNATION OF ANY UNITS REPORTABLE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3, ABOVE;
- (C) COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION;
- (D) THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA;
- (E) THE POINTS OF ENTRY INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA FOR UNITS REPORTABLE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE;
- (F) THE MODE OF TRANSPORTATION TO BE USED (IN SUCH GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AS AIRCRAFT, TRAIN, MOTOR VEHICLE OR SHIP); AND

1. ILLUSTRATIVE DATE, SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

2. FOR PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATIONS DEALING WITH FORCES, "GROUND FORCES" INCLUDES ALL ARMY FORCES AND EXCLUDES AIR FORCE AND NAVAL PERSONNEL. THIS DEFINITION MAY REQUIRE REFINEMENT FOR MBFR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

(G) THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT (IN SUCH GENERAL TERMS AS TRAINING EXERCISE OR ROTATION).

5. THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PROVIDE TO THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT NOTICE OF ANY CHANGES IN SUCH SCHEDULE.

6. AT LEAST 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE NOTICE (INCLUDING SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 022698

THE PERTINENT INFORMATION CALLED FOR IN PARA. I.4 ABOVE) WOULD BE GIVEN OF THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE:

- (A) AN INCREASE OF MORE THAN 10 IN AN ALREADY SCHEDULED MONTHLY TOTAL OF ENTERING PERSONNEL;
- (B) A DECREASE OF MORE THAN 10 IN AN ALREADY SCHEDULED MONTHLY TOTAL OF DEPARTING PERSONNEL;
- (C) THE ENTRANCE INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA OF AN AGGREGATE OF 5,000 OR MORE INDIVIDUAL ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WITHIN 24 HOURS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED;
- (D) THE ENTRANCE INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA OF ONE OR MORE UNITS WITH NORMAL MANNING LEVELS OF MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONNEL WHICH

HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SCHEDULED.

IF ANY OF THESE CHANGES OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF A DELAY OF FIVE DAYS OR LESS IN A PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED MOVEMENT DUE TO UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, NOTICE WOULD BE GIVEN NOT LATER THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE MOVEMENT ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE.

7. IF THE CHANGE INVOLVES A REDUCTION OF 10 PERCENT OR MORE OF THE SCHEDULED MONTHLY TOTAL OF ENTERING PERSONNEL INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA IN A GIVEN PERIOD, NOTICE OF THIS FACT (INCLUDING PERTINENT MODIFICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED) WOULD BE GIVEN NOT LATER THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED ENTRY OF

THE REDUCED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INTO THE AREA. FOR CHANGES INVOLVING A REDUCTION OF LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE MONTHLY TOTAL OF SCHEDULED ENTERING PERSONNEL, ADJUSTMENT WOULD BE MADE AS PART OF THE MONTHLY UPDATE DESCRIBED IN PARA 8 BELOW.

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 022698

8. IN ADDITION TO THE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENTS SPECIFIED ABOVE, THE US AND USSR WOULD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE END OF EACH CALENDAR MONTH REPORT TO EACH OF THE PARTIES THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THEIR ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WHO ENTERED THE GUIDELINES AREA, AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SUCH PERSONNEL WHO DEPARTED FROM THE GUIDELINES AREA, DURING THAT CALENDAR MONTH. SUCH TOTALS WOULD EXCLUDE INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL ENTERING (OR LEAVING) WHO WERE TO REMAIN IN (OR OUTSIDE) THE AREA FOR LESS THAN 30 DAYS.

## II. PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY (ALL FORCES)

1 (US AND SOVIET FORCES)2

1. (THE US AND THE USSR)2/(EACH PARTY)1 WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PROVIDE (TO ALL OTHER PARTIES)1 (THE OTHER PARTY)2 TO THE AGREEMENT, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OR OTHER AGREED MEANS, NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER 1 OF EACH YEAR A SCHEDULE OF MAJOR EXERCISES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA IN WHICH ITS PERSONNEL ARE TO TAKE PART IN THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH SCHEDULE WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT EACH EXERCISE:

(A) THE DATES ON WHICH THE EXERCISE IS TO BEGIN AND END FOR EXERCISES OUTSIDE DEFINED TRAINING AREAS. EXERCISE ACTIVITY WITHIN DEFINED TRAINING AREAS WOULD BE COVERED BY A BLANKET ANNOUNCEMENT INDICATING THE PERIODS DURING WHICH THE AGGREGATE OF PERSONNEL UNDERGOING TRAINING EXCEEDS 10,000.



(B) THE NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED;

(C) THE DESIGNATION OF ITS UNITS INVOLVED;

(D) THE LOCATION OF THE EXERCISE;

(E) THE NUMBER OF ITS MEN, UNIT DESIGNATIONS,  
AND THE DATES OF ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROM  
THE GUIDELINES AREA OF ANY AUGMENTATION

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 022698

FORCES NOT REGULARLY STATIONED IN THE AREA  
THAT WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE;  
AND

(F) THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE, IN GENERAL  
TERMS.

(IN THE CASE OF A MAJOR EXERCISE WHICH IS MULTINATIONAL,  
NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN BY EACH PARTY CONTRIBUTING MORE THAN  
1,000 MEN)<sup>1</sup>

NOTE: BRACKETS FOLLOWED BY 1 INDICATED LANGUAGE  
APPLICABLE TO MEASURES INVOLVING STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS  
FORCES, AND BRACKETS FOLLOWED BY A 2 INDICATE LANGUAGE  
APPLICABLE TO MEASURES INVOLVING US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY

ILLUSTRATIVE DATE SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

2. A MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISE WOULD BE DEFINED AS  
THE DEPLOYMENT INTO OR WITHIN THE AREA OF A DIVISION  
FORCE AND/OR ONE THAT AGGREGATES MORE THAN 10,000  
PERSONNEL IN UNITS OUTSIDE PERMANENT MILITARY GARRISONS.  
THE EXERCISE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS BEGINNING WHEN THE  
COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES LEAVE  
THEIR GARRISONS (IF THESE ARE IN THE GUIDELINES AREA) OR  
ARRIVE IN THE GUIDELINES AREA, AND AS ENDING WHEN THESE  
ELEMENTS ARRIVE BACK IN GARRISON OR DEPART THE GUIDELINES  
AREA. (IF A COMBINED EXERCISE MET THIS DEFINITION, EACH  
PARTICIPANT CONTRIBUTING 1,000 OR MORE PERSONNEL WOULD  
PRE-ANNOUNCE IT.)<sup>1</sup> THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF  
PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE EXERCISE COUNT: (1)  
PERSONNEL INVOLVED ONLY IN DIRECT AIR, RAIL AND ROAD  
MOVEMENTS BETWEEN TWO PERMANENT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS/  
RESERVATIONS, OR BETWEEN A POINT OF ENTRY INTO OR  
DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINES AREA AND A PERMANENT  
MILITARY INSTALLATION, (2) PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TRAINING  
BY A UNIT WITHIN 25 KILOMETERS OF ITS PERMANENT BASE,  
AND (3) PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TRAINING EXERCISES LASTING  
LESS THAN 12 HOURS.

3. (THE US AND THE USSR)<sup>2</sup>/(EACH PARTY)<sup>1</sup> WOULD AT A  
SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 022698

MINIMUM PROVIDE (ALL OTHER PARTIES)<sup>1</sup> (THE OTHER)<sup>2</sup> WITH

NOTICE OF ANY CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) (90) (60) DAYS NOTICE OF THE ADDITION OF  
A MAJOR EXERCISE TO THE CALENDAR, IN-  
CLUDING THE INFORMATION LISTED IN  
PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE;
- (B) (90) (60) DAYS NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN  
LOCATION;
- (C) (90) (30) DAYS NOTICE OF AN INCREASE  
OF MORE THAN 10 IN (1) THE OVERALL SIZE  
OF THE EXERCISE, OR (2) IN THE NUMBER OF  
AUGMENTATION FORCES NOT REGULARLY STA-  
TIONED IN THE GUIDELINES AREA; SMALLER  
INCREASES (LESS THAN 10 PERCENT) WOULD  
BE REPORTED NOT LATER THAN THE START OF  
THE EXERCISE;
- (D) (90) (30) DAYS (BEFORE THE ACTUAL DATE OF  
THE EXERCISE) OF AN ADVANCE OR DELAY OF  
MORE THAN 5 DAYS IN THE DATE OF A  
PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED EXERCISE;
- (E) 24 HOURS NOTICE (BEFORE THE EXERCISE  
ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE) OF AN ADVANCE OR  
OF A DELAY OF UP TO 5 DAYS IN A SCHEDULED  
EXERCISE DUE TO UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES;
- (F) 24 HOURS NOTICE OF A DECREASE IN THE SIZE  
OF AN EXERCISE OF GREATER THAN 10 PERCENT.  
A DECREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE EXERCISE OF  
LESS THAN 10 PERCENT NEED NOT BE REPORTED.
- (G) NOTICE OF CANCELLATION OF AN EXERCISE  
SHOULD BE PROVIDED WHEN KNOWN BUT NOT LATER  
THAN THE DAY THE EXERCISE WAS SCHEDULED  
TO BEGIN;

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 022698

- (H) 30 DAYS NOTICE OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE  
INFORMATION SUPPLIED CONCERNING AN  
EXERCISE.

III. LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATION, NUMBER AND DURATION OF  
MAJOR EXERCISES BY (ALL FORCES)<sup>1</sup> (US AND SOVIET FORCES)<sup>2</sup>

1. (EACH PARTICIPATING NATION)<sup>1</sup> (THE US AND USSR)<sup>2</sup>  
WOULD UNDERTAKE:

(A) NOT TO CONDUCT OR PARTICIPATE IN ANY MAJOR  
EXERCISE, LOGISTIC EXERCISE, OR OTHER  
MILITARY EXERCISE (EXCLUDING TRAINING  
EXERCISES LASTING LESS THAN 12 HOURS) IN  
THE GUIDELINES AREA IN WHICH THE AGGREGATE  
GROUND FORCE ELEMENTS INVOLVED EXCEED  
(35,000) (50,000) PERSONNEL;

(B) NOT TO CONDUCT OR PARTICIPATE IN MORE  
THAN ONE MAJOR EXERCISE AS DEFINED IN  
PARAS II, 2 AND III 1 (A) ABOVE IN THE  
GUIDELINES AREA AT ANY ONE TIME; AND

(C) NOT TO SCHEDULE, CONDUCT, OR PARTICIPATE  
IN MORE THAN SIX SUCH EXERCISES IN ANY  
CALENDAR YEAR OUTSIDE OF DEFINED GROUND  
TRAINING AREAS. THE TRAINING AREAS (SUCH  
AS GRAFENWOEHR, HOHENFELS AND THEIR  
EASTERN EQUIVALENTS) WOULD BE THOSE NOW  
DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING, AND WOULD BE  
LISTED AND DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT.

2. MAJOR EXERCISES WOULD LAST NO LONGER THAN (30)  
(60) DAYS. FURTHER, (NO PARTICIPATING NATION)<sup>1</sup> (NEITHER  
THE US NOR THE USSR)<sup>2</sup> WOULD SCHEDULE A MAJOR EXERCISE  
OUTSIDE OF DEFINED TRAINING AREAS SOONER THAN 30 DAYS  
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF A MAJOR EXERCISE OUTSIDE OF  
DEFINED TRAINING AREAS IN WHICH IT PARTICIPATED.  
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO A MAJOR EXERCISE COULD TAKE PLACE  
BEFORE THE ANNOUNCED BEGINNING DATE OR AFTER THE  
ANNOUNCED ENDING DATE PROVIDED THAT NO MORE THAN 10,000  
SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 022698

PERSONNEL IN UNITS ARE OUTSIDE PERMANENT MILITARY  
INSTALLATIONS OR RESERVATIONS, EXCEPT, THOSE IN THE  
EXEMPT CATEGORIES IN PARA II, 2.

3. (EACH PARTY)<sup>1</sup> (THE US AND THE USSR)<sup>2</sup> WOULD  
UNDERTAKE NOT TO CONDUCT OR PARTICIPATE IN ANY MAJOR  
EXERCISE (AS DEFINED IN PARA II, 2 ABOVE) IN THE GUIDE-  
LINES AREA WITHIN 50 KM OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE FEDERAL  
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OR  
OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EXCEPT IN THE DEFINED TRAINING AREAS  
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH III1(C) ABOVE.

IV. EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY (ALL)<sup>1</sup>  
(US AND SOVIET)<sup>2</sup> FORCES

1. (EACH PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT WITH MORE THAN 10,000 PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN)<sup>1</sup> (THE US AND USSR IN CONDUCTING)<sup>2</sup> A MAJOR EXERCISE (AS DEFINED IN PARA. II,<sup>2</sup>) OUTSIDE DEFINED TRAINING AREAS BUT IN THE GUIDELINES AREA (AND INCLUDING GROUND FORCE ELEMENTS) WOULD INVITE THE OTHER (PARTIES)<sup>1</sup> (PARTY)<sup>2</sup> TO THE AGREEMENT TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE GROUND PHASE OF EACH SUCH EXERCISE. (A PARTICIPATING NATION)<sup>1</sup> (THE US AND USSR)<sup>2</sup> WOULD ALSO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM THE OTHER (PARTIES)<sup>1</sup> (PARTY)<sup>2</sup> TO THE AGREEMENT WHEN (ITS)<sup>1</sup> TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN A DEFINED TRAINING AREA INVOLVED AN AGGREGATE OF MORE THAN 10,000 PERSONNEL IN A COMMON EXERCISE SCENARIO. THE INVITING PARTY WOULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE TO HANDLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH OBSERVERS, AND WOULD INDICATE THE LANGUAGE (OR LANGUAGES)<sup>1</sup> IN WHICH BRIEFINGS ON THE EXERCISE WOULD BE GIVEN.

2. (ANY)<sup>1</sup> (A)<sup>2</sup> PARTY INVITED TO OBSERVE A MAJOR EXERCISE (AS DEFINED IN PARA II,<sup>2</sup>) WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEND UP TO THREE OBSERVERS, TOGETHER WITH UP TO SIX SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THE NAMES OF SUCH OBSERVERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. TOGETHER WITH OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA, SHOULD BE FURNISHED NOT LESS THAN 20 DAYS BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE EXERCISE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE DESIGNATED IN THE INVITATION.

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 022698

3. EACH OBSERVER MAY PROVIDE HIS OWN APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUAL GROUND TRANSPORTATION OR USE THAT PROVIDED BY THE INVITING PARTY. THE OBSERVER MAY DRIVE SUCH VEHICLE HIMSELF OR USE HIS OWN DRIVER, OR REQUEST THE INVITING NATION TO PROVIDE A DRIVER FOR THE INVITING NATION'S VEHICLE.

4. SUCH OBSERVERS WOULD:

(A) HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE EXERCISE AREA, WHILE AVOIDING INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE. THEY MAY ENTER FACILITIES SUCH AS TENTS, BUILDINGS, STORAGE SITES, FORTIFICATIONS, AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT ONLY UPON THE

EXPRESS INVITATION OF AN OFFICER OF THE INVITING PARTY; THEY MAY NOT ENTER FACILITIES OR EQUIPMENT WHERE ENTRY IS RESTRICTED TO SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL OF THE INVITING NATION.

(B) HAVE THE RIGHT TO CARRY THEIR OWN  
PHOTOGRAPHIC, COMMUNICATIONS, AND VISUAL  
ENHANCEMENT EQUIPMENT;

(C) BE GRANTED IMMUNITY FROM ARRE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 27 JUL 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY POLICIES, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY EXERCISES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 JAN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE022698  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** ACDA/IR:THIRSCHFELD  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740175/abbrzcdk.tel  
**Line Count:** 653  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ORIGIN ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 12  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 20 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <12 APR 2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PARM, AU, GE, UK, US, NATO, WARSAW PACT, MBFR  
**To:** USCINCEUR  
CINCUSAFE  
CINCUSAREUR  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
USNMR SHAPE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

